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MEANING AND BELIEF IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Andrei Marmor* 
INTRODUCTION 
The distinction between a concept and its different conceptions plays a 
prominent role in debates about constitutional interpretation.  Proponents of 
a dynamic reading of the Constitution—espousing interpretation of 
constitutional concepts according to their contemporary understandings—
typically rely on the idea that the Constitution entrenches only the general 
concepts it deploys, without authoritatively favoring any particular 
conception of them—specifically, without favoring the particular 
conception of the relevant concept that the framers of the Constitution may 
have had in mind.  Originalists argue, to the contrary, that fidelity to the 
Constitution requires an understanding of its provisions according to the 
particular conception of the abstract concepts prevalent at the time of 
enactment, and not those we may now favor. 
My main purpose in this essay is to put some pressure on the linguistic 
considerations that are presented in this debate, arguing that they are much 
more problematic than the proponents of both positions assume.  I will try 
to show that the debate here is actually a moral-political one, mostly about 
the main rationale of a constitutional regime and the conditions of its 
legitimacy.  It is, primarily, a debate about what constitutions are for, and 
what makes them legitimate.  But I will only get to this moral issue at the 
end.  The main part of the essay will strive to show that the semantic 
considerations employed in this debate are inconclusive; the way concepts 
are used in a given context depends on various pragmatic determinants, and 
those, in turn, depend on the nature of the conversation in question.  The 
moral disagreement is, ultimately, about the kind of conversation that 
constitutional regimes are taken to establish. 
I.  THE SCALIA-DWORKIN DEBATE 
The debate about constitutional interpretation between Justice Antonin 
Scalia and Professor Ronald Dworkin provides a good starting point for our 
discussion.  Scalia is a textualist about statutory interpretation and an 
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originalist (of sorts) about constitutional interpretation.  Many are puzzled 
by this combination, which seems contradictory on its face.  Textualism 
urges judges to focus on what the statutory provision says, as opposed to 
what the legislators may have meant to say; what the legislators may have 
intended to say, supposedly learned by consulting the legislative history of 
the statute under consideration, is regarded by textualism as legally 
irrelevant, something that should not be brought to bear on the appropriate 
interpretation of statutory law.  But when it comes to constitutional 
interpretation, we seem to get the opposite view:  originalism is the view 
that constitutional provisions are to be understood as they would have been 
understood by the Framers of the Constitution and their contemporary 
audience.  Indeed, when you look at Scalia’s decisions and opinions on 
constitutional matters, you often see an essay in legal history, exegetically 
examining historical clues in order to extract some views about the ways in 
which constitutional provisions were understood at the time of their 
enactment.  So if legislative history should be irrelevant to statutory 
interpretation, why is it relevant, indeed central, to constitutional 
interpretation? 
The truth of the matter is that there is less inconsistency here than meets 
the eye.  According to textualism, the main operative factor in statutory 
interpretation is what the law actually says or asserts.  As I have explained 
in greater detail elsewhere,1 textualism explicitly endorses, correctly in my 
mind, an objective conception of the assertive content of an utterance.  
What the law says is at least partly determined by what a reasonable hearer, 
knowing all the relevant background, would infer that it says.  In other 
words, textualism can concede the idea that legal interpretation aims to 
ascertain the communication intentions of the legislature, as long as it is 
granted that the relevant communication intentions are understood 
objectively, that is, as they would be grasped by a reasonable hearer.  Now, 
if you add to this the relevant time frame, which is presumed to be the time 
of enactment, you can begin to see how legislative history might become 
relevant to constitutional interpretation, or, in fact, to any piece of 
legislation that is relatively old.  The purpose of the historical exegesis is to 
ascertain what a reasonable hearer at the time of enactment would have 
inferred that the constitutional provision says.  Thus, Scalia could claim, 
with some plausibility, that in both statutory and constitutional 
interpretation, the task is the same:  try to ascertain what the law says, what 
it actually asserts.  In both cases, assertive content is understood 
objectively, as it would be grasped by a reasonable hearer knowing all the 
relevant background in the context of the utterance.  The only difference is 
that with old enactments, the relevant context and legislative background is 
less clear:  language itself may have changed over time and therefore some 
historical context is needed in order to figure out what the old law or 
 
 1. See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, Textualism in Context (Univ. of S. Cal. Gould Sch. of 
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-13, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2112384. 
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constitutional provision would have meant to a reasonable hearer at the time 
of its enactment.2 
Dworkin is doubtful, however, that the position here is really consistent, 
because it trades on an ambiguity between two possible forms of 
textualism.3  John Perry has recently proposed a very similar argument, and 
in what follows I will use his terminology:  Perry calls these two views 
“meaning-textualism” and “conception-textualism,” respectively.4  The 
difference between these views concerns the question of whether or not the 
assertive content of a legal prescription employing a general evaluative 
concept also includes the particular conceptions associated with the 
concept.5 
Perry gives the example of a university’s departmental decision to make 
“philosophical talent” the main consideration in the department’s hiring 
policy for the future.6  Now, let us assume that most, or perhaps even all, 
the members who voted for this resolution took it for granted that 
philosophical talent consists in analytical rigor, logical skills, a high level of 
technical sophistication, etc.  According to meaning-textualism, the view 
that Perry favors, none of these specific conceptions of what philosophical 
talent consists in form part of the resolution.  Thus, for example, if over the 
years the department’s character changes, and it becomes more skeptical of 
logic and analytical rigor, future members would be warranted in 
implementing their own bona fide views about what philosophical talent is, 
and would rightly consider their new policy as faithfully implementing the 
resolution to be guided by “philosophical talent.”  Conception-textualism, 
on the other hand, would have us maintain that the resolution to be guided 
by “philosophical talent” also includes the enactors’ particular conception 
of what philosophical talent consists in.  And this view, according to Perry, 
makes no sense.7 
The distinction Perry draws here is exactly the same as the one 
exemplified by Dworkin with the constitutional question about the 
Fourteenth Amendment and school segregation.  We know with 
considerable certainty that the framers (very broadly construed, if you will) 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause did not think for a 
moment that racial segregation in schools violates it; we know that their 
conception of equal protection allowed for the doctrine of “separate but 
equal” to stand as constitutionally valid.  Therefore, if we followed the idea 
of conception-textualism, we would have to conclude that Brown v. Board 
 
 2. To be sure, I am not claiming that in his judicial opinions Scalia actually follows this 
rationale.  Many of his opinions refer to historical evidence that can only be taken as 
evidence about the Framers’ further intentions, motives, or purposes, and the like. 
 3. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 119 (1997); see also RONALD 
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996). 
 4. John Perry, Textualism and the Discovery of Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 105, 106 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 
2011). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 108–09. 
 7. Id. at 109. 
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of Education8 was wrongly decided.  And, I take it, nobody would want to 
say that.9  Dworkin and Perry share the view that a consistent and plausible 
textualism would have us read the constitutional provisions in their abstract 
formulation as enacting only the general concept, not the particular 
conception of it that may have been shared by the enactors, or indeed, by 
the population at large, at that time.  To take another example, the asserted 
content of the Eighth Amendment—what this amendment says by 
prohibiting “cruel and unusual” punishment10—is, according to Dworkin, to 
render any punishment that is in fact cruel unconstitutional, and not 
“punishments widely regarded as cruel and unusual at the date of this 
enactment.”11 
All of this sounds very sensible.  But it would be a mistake to conclude 
that Dworkin and Perry win the argument by commonsense linguistic 
considerations, as they seem to suggest.  Undoubtedly, they are correct to 
point out that textualism (in statutory interpretation) and originalism (in 
constitutional interpretation) make for strange bedfellows.  But “meaning-
textualism” is not more workable or linguistically compelling than 
“conception-textualism.” 
The distinction between a concept and its conceptions seems fairly 
compelling at the phenomenological level.  Surely it seems right to say that 
people can have very different and even mutually exclusive conceptions of 
general evaluative terms.  People can talk about the same thing, such as 
“justice,” while profoundly disagreeing about what justice is, what it 
requires, etc.12  Furthermore, we often have a clear sense that such 
disagreements are reasonable.  There is a certain conceptual tolerance, as I 
will call it, that we associate with the concept versus conceptions 
distinction, whereby we assume that rational people can have reasonable 
disagreements about their favored conception of a given evaluative concept.  
You can think that justice is all about what people deserve, in some sense, 
while I can think that desert is a confused idea and justice has nothing to do 
with it.  And yet we have a sense that we are not necessarily talking past 
each other; that in spite of the fact that we have different and incompatible 
conceptions of justice, we are disagreeing about the appropriate conception 
of the same concept. 
Notice, however, that the concept versus conceptions distinction, in this 
form, doesn't apply to just about any general concept we have.  It would be 
strange to say that we can have different and incompatible conceptions of 
“chairs,” or that we can have mutually incompatible conceptions of “red,” 
 
 8. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 9. In some lectures and conversations, Scalia has admitted, I am told, that the case of 
Brown v. Board of Education poses a serious challenge for his views on constitutional 
interpretation. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 11. See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 120. 
 12. As far as I can tell, the distinction between concept and conceptions (of justice, 
actually) was first used, though perhaps not quite introduced by, John Rawls in his A Theory 
of Justice. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). 
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or “redness.”  But even in the case of general evaluative concept-words, 
where the concept versus conceptions distinction seems to be most at home, 
the distinction begs a question:  how can we have very different views 
about what, say, justice is, while still talking about the same thing?  That is, 
what is the thing we are talking about if we understand it very differently?  
In short, what does it mean “to share a concept of X” when we profoundly 
disagree about X’s extension, about what “X” designates or stands for? 
I will suggest that there are two main answers to this question, one of 
which is an externalist approach, modeled on Hilary Putnam’s theory of 
natural kind predicates, and another, which we can call internalism about 
conceptions, modeled on W. B. Gallie’s ideas about essentially contested 
concepts.  The next two sections are devoted to explaining these models and 
some of the problems they give rise to in the present context. 
II.  THE EXTERNALIST MODEL:  NATURAL KINDS 
To share a concept, I will assume here, is tantamount to knowing what 
the word means in the natural language in question.  It is the ability to use 
the word correctly, if you like.  Some philosophers tend to assume that the 
concept of X is somewhat different from the meaning of the word 
designating X.  Perhaps it is the mental representation or some kind of a 
mental image of what X, or the thought about it, is.  I doubt that this is a 
helpful way of talking about concepts, but I will not press the issue here.13  
I will assume, however, that people share a concept when they know what 
the relevant word means in their natural language.  To have a concept of X 
is, or at least requires, if you prefer, to know what “X” means.  Meaning, 
however, is a public feature of language use; words have meanings in virtue 
of our ability to use them more or less the same way across speakers/hearers 
and different sentences in which the word appears. 
Therefore, we can only use words in a natural language if we share some 
beliefs about what the word stands for, its extension, with other speakers.  
Knowing the meaning of a word or how to use it correctly requires speakers 
to know what, by and large, other speakers believe about the extension of 
the word.  In fact, generally speaking, collectively held beliefs about what a 
word stands for, what it signifies, are constitutive of the word’s meaning.  
Needless to say, individual speakers can use many words in ordinary 
conversations without knowing all that there is to know about the extension 
of the word, and often they don’t need to know the nature of the extension 
in great detail or very accurately.  In most cases, however, including in our 
use of general categories or kinds, the meaning of the word is presumed to 
fix the extension (or least the definite extension) of the word, the kind of 
things or objects the word clearly applies to, if used correctly.  Therefore, if 
you know what a word means you know what it stands for, what its 
extension is.  That is generally the case.  However, there is a particular kind 
 
 13. See Andrei Marmor, Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence), in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW 407 (Wil Waluchow & Stefan 
Sciaraffa eds., 2013). 
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of words, identified by Putnam in the 1970s, where the relation between 
meaning and extension goes the other way around, namely, in the case of 
natural kinds.14 
Putnam’s theory of natural kind words has convincingly shown us that 
there are many words in our language that we intend to use, as a matter of 
collective linguistic intention, that is, in a way that purports to designate 
some kind of things, whatever their real nature turns out to be.  With natural 
kinds, such as “tiger,” “water,” or “gold,” over time we observe some 
regularities that we assume are somehow connected; we assume that there 
are some hidden properties in the nature of things that make them what they 
are, or make them the kind of things they are.  And then this kind or 
category is designated by a word, whereby we take that word to “rigidly” 
designate whatever the nature of the kind really is, in a way that is 
essentially externalist.  In other words, the designation of the extension of 
the word is such that it assumes externalism, namely, it assumes that 
whether an object is of the relevant kind/predicate or not depends on the 
constitutive role played by whatever it really is that makes things of that 
kind, irrespective of widely shared beliefs about the nature of the extension.  
And this entails that we can know what a natural kind word means, 
collectively as language users—that is, while entertaining inaccurate and 
perhaps even fundamentally mistaken theories about its extension.  The 
extension of the word is taken to be determined by the true nature of its 
constitutive elements, whatever they really are.15  Since it is probably not 
the case that any rigid designation (à la Saul Kripke16) involves 
externalism, I will henceforth designate the kind of externalist rigid 
designation of extension that is involved in natural kinds as “rigid*.”17 
Admittedly, Putnam has also come to the view that people who use 
natural kind words in their idiolect must share certain beliefs about the 
nature of the extension of the word, which he called stereotypes: 
[S]omeone who knows what ‘tiger’ means . . . is required to know that 
stereotypical tigers are striped.  More precisely, there is one stereotype of 
tigers (he may have others) which is required by the linguistic community 
as such; he is required to have this stereotype, and to know (implicitly) 
that it is obligatory.  The stereotype must include the feature of stripes if 
his acquisition is to count as successful.18 
 
 14. Two clarifications:  First, natural kinds are not the only exception to meaning fixing 
the reference; for example, proper names and pure indexicals also pose exceptions, though in 
different ways.  Second, we should bear in mind that such fixing of reference might be 
temporal and it can change over time.  However, if the use of a given word changes over 
time to designate different things, then we would say that the meaning of the word changed 
over time, it now means something else (e.g., in English, “meat” used to mean food, in 
general; now it means only a subset of food made of animal flesh). 
 15. See HILARY PUTNAM, MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY 215–71 (1979). 
 16. See SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1972). 
 17. See SCOTT SOAMES, Knowledge of Manifest Natural Kinds, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL 
ESSAYS:  THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF LANGUAGE 189 (2009). 
 18. See PUTNAM, supra note 15, at 250. 
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I doubt that Putnam is entirely right about this.  It is probably true that in 
most cases, speakers of a natural language are required to know some 
salient features of a stereotypical token of a type in order to be able to use 
the type-word in their everyday lives.  (And perhaps this is all that Putnam 
meant to say here.)19  However, it seems to me more accurate to maintain 
that stereotype is just a widely shared hypothesis, as it were; it is what 
seems to us, on the surface, to warrant the assumption that the phenomena 
have something deeper in common, something that warrants rigid* 
designation of its extension.  Depending on theories and further knowledge 
acquired about the hidden nature of the kind, the beliefs we have shared 
about the stereotypes may persist over time, or they may need to be revised.  
But, as Putnam himself argued, none of these initial hypotheses is secure 
from possible revision as more knowledge accumulates about the real 
nature of the kind, including the possibility that we got the stereotype(s) 
wrong.20 
The crucial question for us, however, is how much of this natural kinds 
model can be extended to cover other types of words or concepts, in 
particular evaluative terms, like justice, freedom, or equality—the kind of 
terms we find in constitutional documents.  And that depends, you might 
think, on metaethics.  Dworkin, for one, seems to be treating the main 
concepts of constitutional evaluative terms as if they were moral natural 
kinds.21  Perry is also quite explicit that his view about the prohibition of 
“cruel” punishment in the Eighth Amendment presupposes a kind of 
realism about moral terms; it assumes that certain things can turn out to be 
cruel, really cruel, even if people thought otherwise.22  Granted, on the 
basis of an externalist or realist metaethics, construal of evaluative terms 
such as “cruel,” “equal protection,” etc., along the lines of natural kinds is 
plausible.  And then, it seems, we would have the building blocks for the 
kind of dynamic reading of the Constitution that Dworkin and Perry 
espouse.  We could say that the Constitution prohibits cruel punishments 
rigidly*, namely, whatever is really cruel (viz., according to an externalist 
version of “is cruel”), which, practically speaking is tantamount to whatever 
turns out to be cruel upon our best knowledge available at the time of 
interpretation. 
 
 19. It is quite possible that different types of knowledge are required for using a word 
more or less correctly under some circumstances, and for what would count as understanding 
a word as used in a given idiolect.  The differences, however, might be just a matter of 
degree. 
 20. See PUTNAM, supra note 15, at 235.  To be sure, I am not suggesting that the 
meaning of natural kind remains the same even if, over time, there are radical changes in the 
widely shared theories about the nature of its extension.  I don’t think that we have very 
robust intuitions about this. 
 21. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 154–56 (2006); see also David Brink, 
Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105 (1988).  
Brink is a realist about moral terms, while Dworkin is not. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity 
and Truth:  You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996). 
 22. See Perry, supra note 4, at 118. 
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There are several problems with this suggestion, however.  First, even if 
we grant that, as a metaethical position, the externalist model is plausible, it 
does not necessarily settle the question about constitutional interpretation 
we have been discussing here.  Truth doesn’t always settle the question of 
how to understand the law, just as truth doesn’t always affect the content 
that parties to a conversation can convey to each other.  Suppose, for 
example, that both A and B assume that John is married to Susan, and in 
their conversation they refer to Susan as “John’s wife.”  As it happens, the 
truth is that John and Susan are not legally married.  Nevertheless, for all 
practical purposes, nothing is necessarily amiss in the conversation between 
A and B; they both refer to the person they want to refer to, they understand 
each other and the content of the conversation is not necessarily affected by 
their false presupposition. 
Consider a legal case now:  in the curious case of Nix v. Hedden the 
question came up about whether tomatoes are fruit or vegetable.23  The law 
imposed a 10 percent duty on importation of vegetables, and exempted fruit 
from the tariff; the plaintiff, who imported tomatoes, claimed that tomatoes 
are actually fruit, not vegetable, and hence claimed the exemption.  The 
Court acknowledged that, as a matter of scientific taxonomy, tomatoes are, 
indeed, fruit and not vegetable.  Nevertheless, the Court decided that for the 
purposes of determining the classification of tomatoes in the context of this 
law, the ordinary, albeit scientifically mistaken, understanding of people 
that tomatoes are vegetables is the correct reading of the statute.  Didn’t the 
Court realize that the relevant terms here are natural kinds, you might 
wonder?  Well, it did, in a way (though not in these terms, of course); but 
the Court reasoned, and quite sensibly, I think, that natural kind terms are 
not necessarily used as such, either in ordinary conversations or in 
legislation.  Legislation is not a scientific theory, aiming to get to the truth 
of the matter about the real nature of things, so to speak.  The law aims to 
regulate conduct for some particular purposes, and the pragmatics of legal 
utterances must take this into account.  The law often relies on assumptions 
about how people normally understand certain words or concepts, even if 
those understandings are far from accurate or scientifically sound. 
The Nix v. Hedden decision is not out of line with ordinary use of 
language in other contexts.  Rigid* designation, of the kind Putnam 
explored in connection with natural kinds, is a tricky matter.  In many 
cases, it depends on conversational purposes and a speaker’s intentions.  It 
is quite right that when natural kind words, such as “gold,” or “tiger,” or 
“water,” are introduced into natural language, the collective intention of 
language users is to treat these words as natural kinds, rigidly* designating 
the extension, whatever it really is.  But collective linguistic intention 
doesn’t necessarily trump a speaker’s intentions in concrete conversational 
contexts.  Speakers often use words that are normally treated as natural 
kinds without intending to employ rigid* designation in the particular 
context of their utterance.  When you order a fruit salad in a restaurant, you 
 
 23. Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893). 
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really don’t expect to get tomatoes mixed in with the grapes, apples, and 
oranges; in this context the word “fruit” is not meant as a natural kind 
(technically speaking, that is), and the waiter would be rather obnoxious if 
he pretended to have understood you otherwise.  In short, whether we use a 
natural kind word as rigidly* designating its extension or not often depends 
on the relevant interests and salient contextual features shared by parties to 
the conversation. 
Dworkin and Perry could claim, however, that in the context of 
constitutional law, there are good reasons to treat the general moral terms in 
the Constitution as moral natural kinds.  There are two possible arguments 
to that effect:  one, which Dworkin has explicitly made, is linguistic.  
Dworkin argued that the very use of such general and abstract formulations 
as “equal protection of the laws” or “cruel and unusual punishment” is 
itself evidence of the communication intention of the Framers to designate 
rigidly* whatever is the best understanding of the general moral terms.24  
Had the Framers wanted to avoid rigid* designation, they would have used 
much more concrete and specific language, as is normally done in the 
context of statutory law.  So the argument seems to be that in the specific 
context of enacting a constitution, the use of very general and abstract terms 
is decisive evidence of the communication intention of the framers, namely, 
the intention to use the general terms as moral natural kinds.25 
This argument, however, rests on shaky grounds.  First, evidence about a 
speaker’s intention is always defeasible; concrete historical evidence may 
disprove the hypothesis.  Second, the heavy reliance on the actual 
communication intentions of the Framers is a bit perplexing a position for 
Dworkin to hold.  He has made it abundantly clear that in the context of 
statutory interpretation he would not regard communication intentions 
decisive of any interpretative issue—so why make it decisive in 
constitutional interpretation, where it is, morally speaking, much more 
problematic?26  Most important, however, is that Dworkin’s main 
assumption here is far from secure:  people often use very general and 
abstract terms not intending to use them with rigid* designation, even if the 
terms are of natural kinds.  It all depends on the presuppositions of the 
particular conversation in question, namely, on what is taken for granted by 
the speaker and assumed by the speaker to be taken for granted by the 
relevant audience. 
A better argument for the conclusion that general moral terms in the 
Constitution should be understood on the basis of the natural kinds model is 
a moral one.  It is certainly possible for Dworkin and Perry to argue that, 
regardless of actual communication intentions, there are moral-political 
reasons to treat the moral terms in the Constitution as rigidly* designating 
whatever is, actually, the right moral extension of the terms in question.  I 
 
 24. See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 7–12. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 141 (rev. 2d ed. 2005) 
(elaborating on this critique in greater detail). 
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will explore this argument in the last section.  For now, let me just point out 
that, even if we think that the moral argument goes through, two additional 
problems remain. 
First, the conclusion that general moral terms in a constitutional 
document should be understood on the basis of an externalist model ties the 
view about constitutional interpretation to some version of externalism in 
metaethics.  The view only makes sense if we assume that moral terms 
rigidly* designate something that is out there, regardless of our collective, 
widely shared conceptions of its nature.  Perhaps it does not take a full-
fledged version of realism in metaethics to make sense of such a view, but 
some version of externalism about moral concepts is clearly required.27  
The problem is that this may seem like a hefty price tag:  do we really want 
a theory of constitutional interpretation that is tied to a particular 
metaethics, and one that is not uncontroversial, to put it mildly? 
Second, and more important, perhaps, if we construe the relevant 
evaluative terms along the lines of natural kind predicates, the distinction 
between concept and conceptions becomes very problematic.  If you 
assume that, say, “cruel” or “cruelty” is like a natural kind, rigidly* 
designating a moral kind, as it were, then you must assume that there is a 
truth of the matter about which conception of cruelty is correct, if any.  On 
this view, competing conceptions of such concepts are akin to competing 
hypotheses or theories about the true nature of the extension, and therefore, 
if one of them is true, others, incompatible with it, must be false.  But then 
the kind of conceptual tolerance we assumed about different conceptions of 
the same concept, far from being explained, is actually explained away; it 
turns out to be a mistake.  Yet again, this is a hefty price tag for a theory of 
constitutional interpretation.  It entails that rational people cannot have a 
reasonable disagreement about what, say, “equal protection of the laws” 
requires, any more than they can have a reasonable disagreement about the 
chemical composition of water.28  Thus it turns out that the distinction 
between a concept and its different conceptions, employed by Dworkin and 
Perry to explain their views about constitutional interpretation, does not 
provide us with the tools to explain how people can reasonably disagree 
about their favored conceptions of the concept in question.  On the 
externalist semantic model we explored here, such disagreements are, at 
least in principle, resolvable.  Hence if one conception is true, others, 
incompatible with it, must be discarded as false.29  This makes sense as a 
 
 27. Both Perry and Dworkin acknowledge this point to some extent. See DWORKIN, 
supra note 3; Perry, supra note 4. 
 28. Of course, disagreements about the chemical composition of water would have been 
perfectly rational before the discovery that water is composed of H2O.  But even then, it 
must have been assumed that opposing views on the issue could not be mutually consistent. 
 29. Alternatively, one might hold a view that the concept in question refers to the kind of 
things which are out there, in some realist sense, but its nature is essentially unknowable.  In 
that case, disagreements between different conceptions are not, in principle, resolvable.  But 
this would certainly not make the kind of disagreements we have about different conceptions 
more rational than the natural kind model does. 
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model for scientific disagreement, not for a moral-political disagreement of 
the kind we find in constitutional interpretation. 
III.  THE INTERNALIST MODEL:  ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPTS 
The idea that rational people can have reasonable disagreements about 
their favored conception of an evaluative concept gives us a starting point 
for examining a very different approach, suggested by Gallie’s influential 
article about essentially contested concepts.30  As I hope to show here, this 
approach is the opposite of the externalist model that we considered above.  
According to Gallie, there are certain evaluative concepts, such as art, 
democracy, social justice, “a Christian life” and the like, that exhibit a 
particularly strong version of what I have called conceptual tolerance.31  It 
is a strong version because people tend to hold different conceptions of the 
contested concept in a way that is essentially competitive:  on the one hand, 
people tend to think that their favored conception is superior, yet they also 
recognize that their conception is legitimately contested by others and in a 
way that is “not resolvable by argument of any kind.”32  So we are 
presented here with a competition of conceptions, each favored by some 
and rejected by others, characterized by seemingly contradictory beliefs; 
people believe that they got it right and others got it wrong, but they also 
know that no decisive argument can resolve the controversy.  Furthermore, 
Gallie’s main point seems to be that these concepts are such that the 
competitive conceptions they engender are unavoidable; they are essentially 
contested, and do not just happen to be so in a particular context.  Gallie 
employs a hypothetical sports competition to demonstrate his argument.  
The contested concept of the game that Gallie constructs exhibits five 
characteristic features: 
(1) The concept in question must be apprasive, in that it stands for some 
kind of valued achievement. 
(2) The achievement in question must be internally complex. 
(3) The explanation of its worth must refer to the respective contribution 
of its parts or features. 
(4) The accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of 
modifications in light of changing circumstances. 
(5) Each party recognizes that their own understanding of the concept is 
contested by other parties.33 
Presumably, these five features are meant to help us see how certain 
evaluative concepts can be essentially contested, namely, how people can 
think that their conception is superior to other people’s while 
acknowledging that they have no decisive argument to prove it—at least not 
 
 30. W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167 
(1956). 
 31. See id. at 181. 
 32. Id. at 169. 
 33. Id. at 170. 
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in a way that would render a rejection of their argument irrational on the 
part of their competitors. Still, there is something rather curious about this.  
The complexity and interdependence of the various elements that make up 
the relevant concept are not enough to explain its essentially contested 
nature.  There has to be more to it than that. 
Now, we do have one familiar model of evaluative preferences, which 
enables people to have such preferences while acknowledging that others, 
who may disagree, do not have to share them.  We call it “a matter of taste.”  
I prefer French wine to the Californian wines, and I think that French wine 
is generally better, more true to the nature of red wine, as it were, than 
Californian wine, which, in my view, is too fruity and thus too artificial.  
But I do not really think that those who pay more money for a Californian 
wine are stupid or just plain wrong.  This is, at least partly, a matter of taste 
(literally and figuratively, if you will).  Generally speaking, we can say that 
preferences of taste are such that either we think that others do not have to 
share them with us, that there is no other-regarding “ought” in play here, or 
else, if there is some ought in play, the overall evaluation is at least partly a 
matter of some subjective preference and not necessarily a universal 
requirement applying to others similarly situated.  Either way, the 
realization that the relevant evaluative concept in play is such that at least 
part of its components or constitutive features are a matter of taste, makes it 
easy to understand how one’s preferred conception is compatible with a 
strong form of conceptual tolerance. 
Another explanation for the kind of conceptual tolerance that essentially 
contested concepts exhibit can be due to incommensurability:  suppose the 
constitutive elements that make up the evaluative concept are such that they 
are incommensurable with other elements.  To give a schematic example, 
suppose it is generally believed that concept C, apprasive and all, is partly a 
matter of scoring high on dimensions a, b, and c.  However, it is also the 
case that a, b, and c are incommensurable.  Thus, suppose we have two 
conceptions of C, C(1) and C(2), such that C(1) scores higher on a than 
C(2) but lower on b.  If a and b are incommensurable, then we would have 
no exact sense of how much higher on a C(1) has to score to compensate 
for a lower score on b (and vice versa).  And of course, this model can be 
made more complex with more elements in the overall evaluation, colliding 
and competing on various fronts.  To give a concrete example:  consider the 
differences between living in a big city and living in a small town.  Each of 
these lifestyles has advantages and disadvantages on scores of evaluative 
dimensions. And, quite plausibly, some of these dimensions are 
incommensurable; for example, how would you compare lengths of 
commute time with better theater, or a certain level of pollution with better 
schools?  And this would certainly explain why the choice between living 
in a big city or a small town is “not resolvable by argument of any kind.” 
Now, the problem is that both explanations, taste and 
incommensurability, give us as sense of why it is difficult to settle an 
argument about the preference of C(1) over C(2); both explanations give us 
a sense of how people can adhere to competing conceptions of the same 
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general evaluative concept.  But neither explanation seems to give us an 
idea of why people would have a particularly strong other-regarding 
preference for their favored conception.  If C(1) and C(2) are 
incommensurably good (or bad), the rational reaction in the face of 
disagreement should be one of evaluative indifference, not competition.  In 
short, neither taste-based nor incommensurability-based explanations (or 
any combination of both) give us the right sort of contestability here. 
In order to get the right kind of contestability, we probably need to take 
Gallie’s game/sports analogy more seriously:  we get a competition when a 
winner has to be declared.  More broadly, we can say that when a decision 
has to be reached, collectively, institutionally, or authoritatively, about 
which conception gets implemented in a given context or, at least, which 
one is somehow declared the winner, then we are likely to get the kind of 
strong contestability that Gallie had in mind.  Indeed, all the examples that 
Gallie mentions have this element:  in matters of justice we need to make 
collective, often authoritative decisions; indifference or abstention of 
judgment is often not an option, practically speaking.34  Similarly, about 
questions regarding the nature of democracy, what counts as “truly” 
democratic and the like, decisions are often practically needed.35  Art may 
seem like an example where declaring a winner is not quite required, but 
that is not accurate.36  For various practical purposes, such as public 
recognition, financial support, market price, etc., various collectives and 
institutions do need to declare winners and losers. 
Does this mean that competition between conceptions exists where it 
really should not be present?  Is it Gallie’s suggestion here that essentially 
contested concepts exhibit a kind of cognitive overreach?  Undoubtedly, 
there are cases in which the practical need, or perceived need, to declare a 
winner generates distortions, pushing people to believe that their conception 
of an essentially contested concept is superior to other people’s, while the 
simple truth might be that their conception is nothing more than a complex 
subjective preference (at least in part).  How much we want to generalize 
this diagnostic explanation is, of course, a very complex issue that lies at 
the heart of some of the most contentious theories in metaethics and related 
philosophical debates.  I will not pursue this question here.  Instead, I want 
to explore some of the linguistic background further, getting us back to the 
question we started with. 
IV.  SUPERPOLYSEMY AND THE PRAGMATICS OF CONCEPTIONS 
Remember that we started with a puzzle about the relations between 
meaning and beliefs. The question we were interested in concerns the 
possibility of sharing the meaning of a general concept-word while 
disagreeing, sometimes profoundly, about what the word stands for, about 
the essential characteristics of its extension.  The externalist model gave us 
 
 34. Cf. id. at 181–87. 
 35. See id. at 183. 
 36. See id. at 181–82. 
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one plausible account of how convergence in meaning is compatible with 
disagreements about the extension of the word.  Gallie’s theory about 
essentially contested concepts gave us an internalist account; it purports to 
explain the disagreements about the extension of a concept-word in terms of 
the internal complexities of the constitutive elements of the relevant 
concept, and the speakers’ subjective judgments or preferences about the 
relations between them.  The important point to realize is that both models 
work at the general semantic level; they tell us something about the ways 
we normally think about relations between meaning and the extension of 
different types of words/concepts.  In concrete contexts of speech, however, 
pragmatic factors may yield different results. 
We have already seen that natural kind words can be used by speakers in 
a particular context of speech without intending to refer to the extension of 
the word rigidly*.  But now we should see that this is just an example of a 
much more general phenomenon:  the intended reference or extension of 
words used in a given conversation is often sensitive to context and other 
pragmatic determinants of linguistic communication.  A good example is 
the general phenomenon of polysemy, whereby the same nonambiguous 
word would be used to designate different extensions, depending on the 
context of the expression and shared presuppositions, or background 
knowledge, about the world.  Consider, for example, the intended extension 
of a word like “open” in: 
__ open door __ 
__ open view __ 
__ open minded __ 
__ open field __ 
Or, think about the extension of “man” in: 
 “Marriage is a contract between a man and a woman.” 
 “You are a man now (no longer a child).” 
 “Socrates is a man, therefore mortal.” 
 “Jo finally behaved like a man.” 
This sensitivity to context of expressions in designating extension is 
ubiquitous, and applies to evaluative terms as well—often much more so.  
The kind of evaluative concept-words we have in the constitutional context 
may well be called superpolysemy.  These are the kind of evaluative 
concept-words that can be used to refer to different kinds of concerns, often 
only vaguely related to each other, and hugely dependent on context of 
expression.  Consider, for example, the concept of fairness. Suppose 
somebody utters the expression: 
“It is not fair that X . . . .” 
Now consider the following options for X: 
(a) My daughter saying, “. . . you bought my sister a new shirt but not 
me.” 
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(b) The president saying, “. . . the most wealthy people in the country pay 
such low rates of income tax.” 
(c) The inmate in prison saying, “. . . I got convicted, because I didn’t do 
it.” 
(d) My wife saying, “. . . we planned this trip for so long and now the 
weather is going to ruin it.” 
Clearly the words “not fair” stand for rather different kinds of concern 
here.  In (a) there is some notion of equal treatment in play; in (b) there is 
some notion of redistribution in play; in (c) it is a concern about truth and 
deserts; and in (d) it is about bad luck.  Of course, under normal conditions, 
we can easily discern these differences of intended extension and they pose 
no particular problems in ordinary conversation.  Problems arise when the 
intended extension depends on more complex beliefs and presuppositions 
that are not quite as transparent in the conversational situation in play.  
Then, if we try to clarify the relevant presuppositions, we may sometimes 
discover that we have been talking past each other.  At other times, of 
course, we may reach bedrock upon realizing that we simply disagree about 
fundamental questions of value. 
Here is another example, closer to the constitutional context:  many 
people believe that there is too much cruelty involved in some of the penal 
practices currently prevalent in the United States.  Such people have serious 
reservations about the excessive cruelty of exceedingly long prison terms, 
often in harsh conditions, inflicted on offenders, and many think that capital 
punishment is cruel and unjustified.  Now compare the reference of “cruel” 
in these two cases:  excessive prison terms and capital punishment.  Upon 
reflection, it should be clear that speakers use the word “cruel” to refer to 
different kinds of concerns.  Long prison terms are cruel (if they are), in a 
fairly standard sense of the word, namely, one designating the infliction of 
too much harm or suffering that is not necessary under the circumstances.  
But if you ask people whether this is also their main concern about capital 
punishment, my guess is that most people would say it is not.  The moral 
objection to capital punishment does not consist in the concern that the act 
of killing inflicts too much suffering on the condemned.  The moral 
concerns pertain to other aspects of capital punishment, such as the 
irreversibility of it, which is extremely troubling given the possibility of 
error in conviction; its racially biased application; the concern that the state 
should not be in the business of taking away human life; and so on.  In 
short, cruelty about capital punishment refers to something quite different 
from cruelty about long prison terms.  Think about it this way:  in response 
to concerns about harsh and long prison terms, it makes sense to retort:  
“they deserve it”—it would be a relevant (albeit probably misguided) 
reaction.  But in response to the main concerns about capital punishment, 
“they deserve it” is the wrong kind of response.  Many of those who object 
to capital punishment would not deny that heinous murderers may deserve 
to die; what they are concerned about is the risk of error, racism, the role of 
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the state in making it the case that this kind of desert is implemented, and 
similar considerations.37 
In short, general evaluative concepts are typically superpolysemous; such 
concept-words have a very wide semantic range, and they tend to designate 
different types of concerns, depending on context, background assumptions, 
the speaker’s intention, etc.  Elsewhere I elaborated on some of the 
interpretative challenges generated by polysemy in the context of statutory 
interpretation.38  But now, if you think about constitutional documents, you 
can see that polysemy is a major concern, and not only because it plagues 
general evaluative terms of the kind deployed in constitutional documents.  
The main problem in the constitutional case is the essentially thin 
conversational context:  constitutions do not form part of an ordinary 
conversation between parties sharing a great deal of background contextual 
knowledge.  After all, the main purpose of constitutions is to regulate 
conduct on a large scale, in very general terms, for generations to come.  It 
is not anything like an intimate conversation between parties situated in a 
particular context.  In other words, the conversational context of 
constitutional provisions is inevitably very thin. 
Now, you might think that the thin conversational background of 
constitutional enactments vindicates Dworkin’s position; it shows that 
understanding general constitutional provisions in all but their most abstract 
terms is inevitable because we lack the kind of conversational 
background—and other pragmatic determinates of communicated content—
that we would normally have in an ordinary conversation.  In other words, 
we can reinterpret Dworkin’s argument to say that the mistake of 
originalism is precisely that it deals with constitutional enactment as if it 
were an ordinary conversation, where we can construe the intended 
extension of words used by relying on normal pragmatic determinants, 
whereas, in fact, there are no such pragmatic factors in play.  Though this 
line of thought is in the right direction, it is still rather precarious.  
Originalists could reply that nothing is said entirely out of context.  Even if 
the conversational context of constitutional enactments is relatively thin, 
some context is surely there, and sometimes, at least, it is essential for 
understanding what the Constitution says. 
Consider, for example, the formulation in the Eighth Amendment of the 
prohibition on inflicting “cruel and unusual” punishment.  This is an 
ambiguous expression:  does it mean that a form of punishment would be 
unconstitutional only if it is both cruel and unusual, or if it is either cruel or 
 
 37. I can see an objection to the example:  one might argue that people couch their 
objection to capital punishment in terms of cruelty only because of the language of the 
Eighth Amendment, and not because they think that cruelty is really an issue here.  Well, 
yes, it is quite possible that this is the case now in the United States, but I would venture to 
guess that cruelty had been an issue with capital punishment in European countries at the 
times when those countries debated the issue and decided to abolish capital punishment.  But 
not much hangs on this; other, similar examples are abundant. 
 38. Andrei Marmor, Varieties of Vagueness in the Law (Univ. of S. Cal. Gould Sch. of 
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-8, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2039076. 
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unusual?  This type of ambiguity is typically pragmatic.  Logicians would 
tell you that “P & Q” is true if and only if P is true and Q is true, and false if 
either one is false.  But now suppose you see a sign on the entrance to a 
store saying, “No dogs and cats allowed”—surely, the sign is not meant to 
keep out only those patrons who happen to have both a dog and a cat, but 
also those who have either one.  The opposite is true of a sign saying:  “No 
drinking and driving”—it is not meant to suggest that either drinking or 
driving is prohibited, only the combination of the two.  This familiar type of 
scope ambiguity is normally resolved by contextual or background 
knowledge of the parties to the conversation.  One cannot infer the right 
conclusion from the meaning of the expression alone.  So there is 
something about context we must know in order to interpret the “cruel and 
unusual” punishment prohibition; the semantics of conjunction would not 
give us the answer. 
To be sure, I am not trying to defend originalism in this Article.  I think 
that Dworkin’s position is much more plausible from a moral point of view.  
But in order to get to it, we need a moral-political argument, not a linguistic 
one.  The way we think about the linguistic framework of constitutional 
documents depends on the moral-political framework, not the other way 
around. Let me explain what I mean here. 
V.  THE MORAL DEBATE AND THE NATURE OF THE CONVERSATION 
Constitutions are, by their very nature, precommitment devices.  When a 
legal system adopts a constitution, especially one that is fairly “rigid” (as 
the U.S. Constitution certainly is), the legal system basically precommits to 
certain principles of governance and certain moral-political principles that 
are deliberately made difficult to change by the ordinary democratic process 
of legislation.  Like Ulysses who ties himself to the mast and, crucially, 
orders his subordinates to ignore his future orders, in order to prevent the 
possibility of succumbing to irresistible temptation in the future, 
constitutions tie the nation to the mast, striving to make it difficult to 
succumb to some future temptations.  The question of what makes this 
precommitment device legitimate, especially in the face of its essentially 
antidemocratic (or at least antimajoritarian) element, is the central question 
about the legitimacy of constitutionalism.  Neither Dworkin nor Scalia 
purport to provide us with an elaborate answer to this question, but it is 
clear that they have very different views about it, and that they understand 
the precommitment aspect of constitutionalism very differently. 
According to Scalia, the whole point of entrenching certain moral-
political principles in a rigid constitutional document is to freeze those 
principles in time, as it were.  It is, after all, the whole point of a 
constitutional regime to predetermine certain issues, controversial as they 
may become, and freeze a certain resolution to those issues in time, for 
generations to come. Not a total freeze, of course; constitutions provide for 
their own amendment process and can be changed accordingly.  But the 
amendments are not easy to accomplish, and precisely because their whole 
point is to function as a countermajoritarian element in the legal system, 
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making it difficult to change by the ordinary democratic processes.  
Therefore, Scalia concludes, it is incumbent on interpreters of the 
Constitution to defer to an “original” understanding of its content, because 
this is the whole point of the precommitment to constitutional constraints.  
If we don’t like those ideas then we need to amend the Constitution.  
Allowing judges to adapt the Constitution to current moral-political 
conceptions, and thus circumventing the burdensome amendment process, 
would be tantamount to subverting the very idea of constitutionalism as an 
anti-majoritarian precommitment device.  This, I submit, is quite simply the 
main idea behind originalism in constitutional interpretation.39 
Those, like Dworkin, who favor a much more dynamic version of 
constitutional interpretation, obviously disagree; they see the 
precommitment element of a constitutional regime as much more limited.  
Why is that?  Presumably, because there is something deeply problematic 
about the very idea of an intergenerational precommitment of the kind 
imposed on us by rigid constitutions.  It is far from obvious that any one 
generation should have the moral authority to bind future generations to its 
conceptions of the just and the good.  But, to some extent, this is precisely 
what constitutions do, and inevitably so.  They bind future generations to 
the mast, making certain decisions about morality and politics much more 
difficult to accomplish than would normally be allowed by an ordinary 
democratic process.  This intergenerational authority is morally 
problematic, to say the least, and its legitimacy is far from evident.  And, of 
course, the more we regard constitutional content as tied to its original 
understanding, the more acute the problem of legitimacy becomes.  
Therefore, allowing the Supreme Court to adapt the content of the 
Constitution to current understandings of its main moral-political principles 
is a means of mitigating the intergenerational concern. 
I won’t pretend to have made any philosophical news here; these 
fundamental problems about the legitimacy of a rigid constitutional regime 
are well known and their implications well understood.  The suggestion I 
make here concerns the ways in which we should think about the linguistic 
considerations that bear on this debate.  What I have tried to show is that 
the protagonists in the debate got the direction wrong here.  They conduct 
the argument as if the linguistic considerations about the concept versus 
conceptions distinction can be utilized to support their moral-political views 
about the rationale of a constitutional regime and its moral legitimacy.  But, 
in fact, it is exactly the other way around.  The moral-political views about 
the rationale of a rigid constitutional regime are the ones that should inform 
 
 39. See SCALIA, supra note 3.  This main rationale needs many further refinements and 
adaptations, of course.  For example, even if we are totally committed to an original 
understanding of a constitutional provision, borderline cases of vague terms might not be 
contextually determined, and judicial precisification of such vague terms may be needed.  
Even the most dogmatic version of originalism must allow for some judicial innovation in 
the face of changing circumstances and relatively thin contextual information.  I am told by 
constitutional lawyers that this is now called “construction,” as opposed to “interpretation.”  
In their terminology, originalism concedes, as it must, that some constitutional construction 
is necessary.  Well, quite a bit, I would say. 
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the ways in which we think about what kind of speech act constitutional 
documents are, and the kind of conversation that constitutions establish. 
Why so?  If you think that the intergenerational precommitment 
embodied in a rigid constitutional framework is legitimate, as originalists 
clearly do, then you would be quite right to regard the constitutional 
document as an ordinary speech act, whereby the Framers of the 
Constitution purport to communicate some definite legal content, and it is 
our task to try to figure out what that content is.  In other words, according 
to the moral-political view shared by originalists, it makes sense to think 
about the Constitution as a legislative speech act in a conversation between 
Framers and subjects, just as we think about ordinary legislation as a 
conversation in which the legislature says something and we try to 
understand what the legislature actually said (and perhaps also what it 
implicated or presupposed, etc.).  In other words, the more you agree with 
the precommitment rationale of constitutionalism, the more you would be 
inclined to think about the constitutional document as a product of an 
ordinary speech act that purports to communicate certain contents that we 
need to ascertain, akin to ways in which we think about ordinary legislation.  
And vice versa, of course.  The more doubtful you are, morally speaking, 
about the precommitment rationale of a constitutional regime, and in 
particular, the more concerned you are about the intergenerational authority 
of a rigid constitution, the less you would be inclined to think about the 
Constitution as a legislative speech act.  The general constitutional 
provisions containing abstract moral-political principles, according to this 
view, might be seen as a kind of vague and general framework, setting the 
language in which moral-political concerns need to be phrased, but leaving 
the content of the relevant expressions free for us to shape as we deem right 
at any given time.  Thus, the real debate here is about the nature of the 
conversation that our constitutional regime establishes, which depends on 
our views about the rationale of constitutionalism:  what constitutions are 
for and what makes them legitimate. 
An objection needs to be answered before we conclude the discussion:  
the nature of the conversation, one might think, is typically determined by 
the speaker.  What kind of conversation one engages in is not usually an 
open question, and typically not one for the hearer to determine.  It is 
normally the speaker who gets to set the terms of the conversation, as it 
were.  Whether something has been said as a straightforward proposition, or 
in jest, or ironically, or fictitiously, are matters that depend on the speaker’s 
intention.  If that is correct, one might resist the idea that there is room for a 
moral-political debate about the nature of the conversation that constitutions 
establish; one might think that we are forced to side with the originalists 
and maintain that it is up to the Framers and their communicative intent to 
set the terms of the relevant type of conversation in question here. 
This objection can be answered without too many difficulties.  Though it 
is generally true that the speaker gets to determine the nature of the 
conversation, it is not always the case.  In some cases, the nature of the 
conversation is partly determined by the hearer, not the speaker.  A clear 
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example, though perhaps not very close to our concerns here, is a typical 
conversation between patient and psychologist, whereby the patient tells a 
story, from a certain autobiographical perspective, and the psychologist 
registers something else, not so much the content conveyed but the reasons 
or hidden motives for conveying it, the kind of things the content conveyed 
tells about the patient and his or her problems, etc.  A session with a 
psychologist (or a conversation with a friend who wants to be your 
psychologist on that occasion) is one clear example where the speaker does 
not get to determine the kind of conversation that actually takes place. 
Another example, and much closer to our concerns, happens when 
authors speak to multiple audiences, situated in different contexts and often 
spanning different times and places.  The main example, of course, is 
literature and other similar forms of art.  It is a very familiar point that the 
ways in which we understand literature is partly a matter of aesthetic and 
artistic judgment exercised by the readers, irrespective, at least to some 
extent, of the intentions of the authors.  In other words, it is part of our very 
conception of literature that the speaker/author does not necessarily get to 
determine, as it were, what exactly is the nature of the conversation she 
conducts with her readers.  What kind of conversation takes place between 
authors and readers in the case of literature is an open question, never 
entirely determined by the relevant authors.  In this respect, constitutional 
law is much closer to literature than one might have thought.  In both cases, 
the nature of the conversation is partly up to the readers, not the authors, to 
determine.  And in both cases, different ways of understanding the nature of 
the conversation reflect different evaluative views about the nature of the 
enterprise and the kind of values we find in it. 
If this argument looks like the kind of argument Dworkin himself should 
have made, the impression is not mistaken.  I have long argued that one of 
Dworkin’s best insights about the nature of interpretation concerns the ways 
in which evaluative views about the nature of the genre, or the relevant 
enterprise, necessarily inform any particular interpretative views within it. 
Without having some views about the main values we find in the genre to 
which the object we strive to interpret belongs, it is almost impossible to 
say anything about what would count as an acceptable interpretation.  You 
cannot begin to offer an interpretation of a novel if you have no views about 
what makes novels good and worthy of our appreciation.  Similarly, I don't 
see how one can have any theories about constitutional interpretation that 
are not responsive to one’s moral-political theory about the rationale of 
constitutionalism and the moral legitimacy of judicial review.  Had 
Dworkin followed his own line of thought here, there would have been no 
need on his part to rely on the kind of linguistic and historical 
considerations that his arguments about constitutional interpretation 
deployed over the years.  One can only surmise that Dworkin wanted to 
defeat the originalists on their own turf.  But that doesn’t work, and it only 
obscures the true nature of the debate, which is, as Dworkin should have 
been the first to note, essentially a moral-political debate about what 
constitutions are for and what makes them legitimate to begin with. 
